Summary: This paper examines the Late Payment Directive of the European Union and seeks to answer the question of whether the provisions of the Directive apply to loan contracts in corporate transactions. The paper first describes and analyses the Late Payment Directive and provides a comprehensive analysis of relevant arguments and legal sources. It then evaluates the different factors required by the Late Payment Directive and finally argues that the Late Payment Directive has to be applied to loan contracts and facility agreements, even if this is not explicitly foreseen in the Directive.
Introduction
Lending and borrowing have become common transactions in everyday life, now constituting an entire branch of business. In this context, payment delays happen almost daily as well, and while the European Union has already been trying to remedy late payment in the European Single Market for most transactions, it still remains unclear whether these European remedies apply to lending operations. This paper addresses the described issue and seeks to find a solution based on European law. The paper will start by offering a general overview of the Late Payment Directive 1 and its development. This initial section is necessary for fully understanding the background and aims of the Directive, as well as the possible results that are triggered by an application of the Directive to lending transactions. The second and main section of the paper focuses on the question of whether the Directive can be applied to loan contracts and, furthermore, which provisions in the Directive argue for or against such an interpretation.
Commercial Relevance
The Late Payment Directive, adopted on 16 February 2011, is a European Union legislative act that aims at tackling the issue of late payments. In the commercial environment of the Member States, many payments are executed later than initially accorded in the contract, even if one party has already fulfilled its obligations (i.e., the goods have already been delivered or the services have already been performed).
2 This leads to a situation wherein the seller of a good or provider of a service is forced to credit the outstanding amount to the buyer.
Late payment influences business transactions in a negative manner.
3 When the buyer withholds payment, the liquidity of the seller is impaired, as well as it hinders the seller's effective financial management. He is forced to wait for capital that he could have invested in the meantime. This, in turn, will affect his competitiveness and profitability. 4 If the seller is forced to obtain external financing to fulfil his own obligations, he will be burdened with interest rates that are higher than the rates he usually charges to his trade partners for late payment (hence, he will make a loss).
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are especially vulnerable to late payment, as they typically hold less liquid assets than larger enterprises. They tend to rely on larger suppliers or other business actors that possess more market power.
5 Their bargaining power is comparatively weak when contracting with dominant enterprises. 6 Additionally, when it comes to late payment, the administrative costs of pursuing debts are disproportionately high for SMEs. This is the result of a lack of time and manpower to chase outstanding debts, as it is harder for SMEs to afford specialised staff engaged specifically to manage the recovery of debt.
7 Larger entities can usually cope with late payment more easily and can employ additional staff due to economies of scale.
The very existence of SMEs can be jeopardised due to late payment: when the outstanding amounts lead to lack of cash, the undertaking can be forced into insolvency.
9 Late payment is the major reason for illiquidity 10 and the reason for twenty-five percent of all bankruptcies in the European Union.
11 Larger enterprises hold sway over SMEs in a way that they have the power to 'starve out' unwanted business partners or disliked competitors.
12 By intentionally withholding payments -a behavior that in the past was seldom followed by any negative consequences -a company can essentially force its contracting partner into insolvency proceedings.
The Late Payment Directive and Loan Contracts

General Remarks
The Late Payment Directive provides a number of measures 13 that should deter late payment; however, the central provisions of the Directive revolve around the interest rule.
14 The Directive gives companies an entitlement to interest payments in the event of late payment, without foreseeing any reminder requirements. 15 The interest rate is comparatively high, which should deter buyers from executing payments later than their due date. 16 Parties individually may agree on a lower interest rate, which, however, is subject to an unfairness test. 26 To define a body governed by public law, several criteria are relevant. First, it has to be established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest (therefore, it must not pursue an industrial or commercial purpose).
27 Secondly, it must have a legal personality. For the third criterion, one out of three alternatives has to be fulfilled: (1) the body is financed (at least for the most part) by a State, regional or local authority or another body governed by public law; (2) the body is subject to management supervision by those bodies; or (3) the body has an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by named authorities. Each of the three alternatives under the third criterion essentially indicates a proximity to the public sector. Other entities, such as associations, political parties, trade unions or religious communities, are not governed by the Late Payment Directive due to their non-commercial nature (as long as they do not fulfil the definition of a body governed by public law).
29 Consumers are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Directive.
30
As an initial result of the above constraints, it can be summarized that the Late Payment Directive only applies to loan contracts between two undertakings or an undertaking and a public authority. It can therefore be hold preliminarily that the Late Payment Directive is restricted to corporate transactions. As a next step, it has to be clarified if corporate loans fall under the heading of corporate transactions.
Delivery of Goods or Provision of Services
A commercial transaction must involve the delivery of goods or the provision of services, both for remuneration. 31 These are the typical components of a synallagmatic relationship (i.e., the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration). In the case of corporate loans, it has to be clarified whether the provision of money constitutes a service at all.
To start with, Article 2 (1) explains that a commercial transaction can include a service provided by an undertaking in exchange for remuneration. Whether a financial service (like the provision of money) is covered by the term 'service' , has to be specified in greater detail. 35 In other words, an exemption would not be necessary if financial services were not first considered services in general. Excluding financial services from certain legislative acts makes sense given the particular nature of financial services. On the other side of that coin, this means that the financial services sector in many aspects requires different regulation than the traditional services sector. 36 Alongside, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) qualifies financial services as services. This was made clear in a judgement in 1998 wherein the Court held that the 'grant of a credit facility is indeed the provision of a service […] . ' 37 This is maintained in other holdings of the ECJ 38 and it is already well-settled case law that an institution that provides credit is to be understood as a service provider. , 2015, vol. 36, no. 38, p. 1809. 36 This is the reason for the special regulation of financial services in many regards. Cf. FRE-ITAG, Robert. Unternehmenskredit und Zahlungsverzug. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2015 , vol. 36, no. 38, p. 1809 . 37 ECJ 17 March 1998 sation for damages (including payments from insurance companies), from the scope of the Directive. 40 These exemptions, however, imply that insurance contracts in general can (and should) be subsumed under the Late Payment Directive. As insurance contracts undoubtedly belong to the financial services sector, the narrow exemption suggests that the Late Payment Directive covers other contracts within this sector. 41 In light of all the above factors, the provision of money seems rightly classified as a service. Therefore, as an interim result, it can be held that if the provision of capital is a 'service' in the context of the Late Payment Directive, said Directive has to be applicable to loan contracts.
Commonly in European law
The Concept of Remuneration
The final criterion of Article 1 (2) of the Directive that has to be fulfilled is the presence of remuneration, as the '[…] Directive shall apply to all payments made as remuneration for commercial transactions.' 42 In Recital 8, it is again specified that the scope of the Directive is limited to remuneration payments. 43 Consequently, not all commercial payments are governed by the Directive, but only such payments that are made as remuneration for a commercial transaction. However, the Directive does not include a definition of the term 'remuneration' . In the German version of the Directive, the expression 'Entgelt' is found, which usually describes any consideration for a contractual obligation. In general, it can be stipulated that remuneration only comprises monetary obligations. 45 In order to subsume facility agreements under the Late Payment Directive, it has to be clarified which part of a loan agreement can be regarded as remuneration. In Austria, for instance, remuneration for a loan is the interest that is provided for in the loan contract. 46 In the German literature, the remuneration aspect of loans is argued in different ways. 47 The predominant view holds that only the contractual entitlement to interest represents the creditor's consideration for the provision of capital. The German literature thus (in line with the Austrian view) qualifies the interest for a credit as remuneration, 48 which has to be distinguished from the simple repayment of the credited amount. The credited amount is hereinafter referred to as the 'proceeds of the loan' . Said proceeds of the loan do not constitute remuneration for the provision of the service, but have to be returned as part of the contractual obligations in the synallagmatic relationship. 49 This opinion was mainly shaped by Freitag, who invokes two Directives to supplement his arguments. Alongside the Consumer Credit Directive, 50 he mentions the Mortgage Credit Directive. 51 He argues that neither of these Directives considers the proceeds of a loan as remuneration. They in fact differentiate between the terms 'borrowing rate' and other 'charges' versus 'repayment. ' Nevertheless, Junglas recently tried to disprove this common perspective and argued for the contrary, in order to classify the proceeds of the loan as remuneration as well. According to his point of view, remuneration is the counter-value of a service and, therefore, the equivalent of the service in question. According to this view, if the provision of money constitutes the service, everything that is provided in return should be regarded as remuneration. Junglas qualifies the repayment of the loan as remuneration for the provision of money and the interest on the loan as remuneration for capital utilisation. He points out that the repayment of the proceeds of the loan has a recompensing effect, and that is not the money in rem that is given back but a certain amount of money (which will not be the exact same bank notes that were provided initially). 52 This amount of money cannot be regarded as a 'black box' that is given forth and back. The provision of money is a service, which is remunerated by everything that is given in return. Both the proceeds of the loan, as well as the interest, therefore constitute remuneration in Junglas' view.
The classification of the remuneration part is relevant, as the actual outcome determines how much interest is due in the case of late repayment of a loan. If the first view is supported, interest can only arise on the contractual interest that is paid back late (i.e., interest on the interest for the loan), but not on the outstanding amount that qualifies as the proceeds. If, however, Junglas' approach is followed, interest for late payment can be demanded for the entire outstanding amount, i.e. for the proceeds of the loan and for the outstanding interest.
This second view constitutes an undoubtedly more effective measure against late repayment of loans and therefore makes more sense from an economic point of view. To claim interest for just a part of an outstanding instalment seems inadequate. Junglas argues that the prevailing view in Germany is too narrow and relies too much on the national, From a dogmatic point of view, Junglas' argumentation is questionable, as it does not fit in with the Austrian or German legal system or the general understanding of the law. 54 Nevertheless, in terms of content, his rationale is persuasive. An approach that solely relies on a national legal system is too formalistic and does not reflect European Union law. As the goal of the Directive is to ensure liquidity, the predominant German view turns out to be too focused on national legal doctrine. The Late Payment Directive as a European legislative act demands that national understandings of the law have to be applied restrictively for the benefit of European law as a whole. Nothing in the Directive indicates that the proceeds of a loan are not covered by its jurisdiction.
Excursus: Compound Interest
A final issue worth mentioning is the treatment of compound interest. As set out above, late repayment of a loan entitles the creditor to demand interest on the outstanding amount. The outstanding amount includes the contractual interest; therefore, he may demand interest on interest. This interest on interest constitutes so-called compound interest, and some Member States forbid it. 55 The intention for such a prohibition lies in the protection of the debtor, who should be able to foresee the amount of debt that may arise. 56 According to the so-far stipulations, however, national law providing for a prohibition on the accrual of compound interest should be interpreted narrowly. The law of the European Union demands an autonomous interpretation of directives. If an interpretation curbs the effects of a directive, this interpretation cannot be regarded as being in line with European law. 57 For the purpose of the present analysis, this means that a restriction on a claim to interest would run counter the Late Payment Directive's objectives by keeping the creditor from his remedy for late payment. lished between two undertakings or an undertaking and a public authority, the provisions of the Late Payment Directive apply. This results from the classification of a loan as a 'service' . Interest for the outstanding amounts can accordingly arise on the entire amount, not only on the outstanding interest.
The effects of this outcome, however, are extensive. For one thing, many Member States might face infringement proceedings due to inadequate implementation of the Directive. For another thing, this interpretation might put a whole new complexion on corporate loans. Finance providers become vested with a set of rules that strengthens their position. It is apparent that this contributes to the protection of creditors and fosters the functioning of the market, just as it was intended by the European legislature.
